Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention: Legal Questions (Without Answers) Concerning the People’s Ability to Reform California’s Government Through a Constitutional Convention by Miller, Steven
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2011
Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention:
Legal Questions (Without Answers) Concerning
the People’s Ability to Reform California’s
Government Through a Constitutional
Convention
Steven Miller
Hanson Bridgett, LLP
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven Miller, Getting to a Citizens’ Constitutional Convention: Legal Questions (Without Answers) Concerning the People’s Ability to
Reform California’s Government Through a Constitutional Convention , 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 545 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol44/iss2/5
  
 
545 
GETTING TO A CITIZENS’  
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION:  
LEGAL QUESTIONS (WITHOUT ANSWERS) 
CONCERNING THE PEOPLE’S ABILITY TO 
REFORM CALIFORNIA’S GOVERNMENT 
THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 
Steven Miller* 
In 2009 and 2010, a reform organization named Repair California 
worked to place on the November 2010 general election ballot a pair of 
propositions that would have called for a citizens’ constitutional 
convention to substantially revise the California Constitution. The 
movement for reform eventually dissipated, and the propositions did not 
make it to the 2010 ballot. However, the call for a citizens’ convention 
presented novel legal questions, including whether voters could call for 
a convention at all, whether a convention could be called in a single 
election by two complementary ballot measures, whether delegates 
could be selected rather than elected, and whether voters could limit the 
scope of the convention to prevent ancillary issues from sidetracking 
the structural issues Repair California had hoped to address. This 
Article briefly surveys these and other questions raised by the call for a 
citizens’ convention and discusses how proposition drafters hoped to 
resolve them. 
 
 * Steven Miller is Senior Counsel with the San Francisco law firm of Hanson Bridgett, 
LLP where he practices government and public agency law.  I would like to thank John Grubb of 
the Bay Area Council, whose vision influenced the entire constitutional convention project, and 
whose infectious enthusiasm for a worthwhile cause made frequent challenges a pleasure to 
endure. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Jim Wunderman, the President and CEO of the Bay Area 
Council—“a business-sponsored, public-policy advocacy 
organization for the nine-county Bay Area”—published an op-ed 
piece in the August 21, 2008, San Francisco Chronicle asserting that 
“our California government is not only broken, it has become 
destructive to our future.”1 The dysfunction of government had risen 
to such a level, Wunderman decried, that the “drastic measure[]” of a 
convention to rewrite the California Constitution offered the only 
hope.2 
Wunderman’s editorial was initially met with considerable 
enthusiasm and ultimately resulted in an organization called Repair 
California preparing and circulating for signature two related ballot 
measures calling for a citizens’ constitutional convention.3 As a 
lawyer for Repair California, I was the principal drafter of the two 
ballot measures. 
Drafting Repair California’s ballot measures required filtering 
policy decisions and political pressures through a legal risk analysis 
process. Many of these political and policy issues arose quickly and 
needed to be decided in a matter of days. The legal ramifications of 
these decisions were sometimes only of secondary importance—
Repair California needed to balance the political reality of making a 
decision with the risk that the decision could cause legal problems in 
the future. As many of the legal issues surrounding a constitutional 
convention are novel, unknown future legal risk inevitably took a 
backseat to practical and immediate political benefit. As a result, we 
always assumed that calling for the first constitutional convention in 
131 years 4 would raise some legal questions that only the courts 
could answer. 
 
 1. Jim Wunderman, California Government Has Failed Us, SFGATE, (Aug. 21, 2008), 
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-08-21/opinion/17123410_1_constitutional-convention-new-
government-california-constitutional-revision-commission. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Jim Wunderman, Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Citizen’s Constitutional 
Convention Act (Oct. 28, 2009), http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/ 
i863_initiative_09-0066.pdf.; Jim Wunderman, The Call for a Citizens’ Limited Constitutional 
Convention (Oct. 28, 2009) http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/initiatives/pdfs/i864_initiative_09-
0067.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). 
 4. The last constitutional convention in California was in 1879. See 1878–1879 
Constitutional Convention Working Papers, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
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As I write this Article almost three years later, enthusiasm for 
reform has fizzled such that not only did Repair California’s proposal 
for a citizens’ constitutional convention die without having qualified 
for the November 2010 ballot, but many competing reform ideas that 
were perhaps inspired by Repair California  also mostly expired. 
Immediate concern over the state’s ever-deepening budget crises has 
largely displaced more visionary efforts to reform long-term 
underlying structural problems plaguing California’s system of 
government. Therefore, there will be no judicial answers to some of 
the fundamental legal questions raised by Repair California’s 
proposed convention. 
In this Article, I do not discuss the pros and cons of holding a 
constitutional convention in the first place. Rather, I start from the 
assumption (rendered moot at this point by history) that a 
constitutional convention is a good idea. Nor does this Article 
purport to provide in-depth scholarly analysis of the complex 
constitutional questions underlying the constitutional convention 
movement. Rather, this Article provides a practitioner’s perspective 
on five key issues that presented themselves as we worked to draft 
Repair California’s now-failed initiative measures. My hope is that 
the following overview will be useful to those seeking to understand 
Repair California’s proposal, with an eye toward improving on it and 
trying in the future to chart a more successful path to a constitutional 
convention. 
II.  CAN THERE EVER BE A CITIZENS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION? 
Article XVIII, section 2, of the California Constitution reads, in 
part: “The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-
thirds of the membership of each house concurring, may submit at a 
general election the question whether to call a convention to revise 
the Constitution.”5 
A threshold issue with Repair California’s citizens’ convention 
was that the constitution does not envision such a concept. Repair 
California initially assumed that in today’s initiative-happy 
environment anyone could put anything on the ballot. But in fact, 
 
archives/collections/1879/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (providing a record of the convention 
activities). 
 5. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
  
Winter 2011] LEGAL QUESTIONS 549 
under article XVIII, section 2, before a convention may be held, the 
legislature, by a two-thirds vote, must ask the people if there should 
be a convention, and the people must vote yes. 6 The measure calling 
for a convention can only be placed on the ballot by the legislature. 
It seemed clear that the legislature would never act. 7 In order to 
call for a citizens’ convention, therefore, a two-step process would be 
required. The first step (what we began to refer to as “Prop 1”) would 
require passage of a constitutional initiative modifying article XVIII, 
section 2, of the constitution to allow the people to place on the 
ballot the question of whether to call a convention without a two-
thirds vote of the legislature. The irony was not lost on us that we 
had to rely on the initiative process in order to call a convention to 
revise the constitution—including specifically reforming the 
initiative process. The second step (what we called “Prop 2”) would 
be the measure asking that question itself—the call for a 
constitutional convention. Prop 2 would not alter the constitution, but 
would instead be a statutory initiative that would include many 
details from Repair California’s proposal. 
As discussed below, Repair California had additional policy 
concerns that dictated additional modifications to article XVIII, 
section 2. A fundamental question raised by the final version of 
Prop 1 was whether those modifications meant that the proposed 
measure was itself a constitutional revision that could not be enacted 
through an initiative. This all-important question is discussed in Part 
VI below, after consideration of the proposed modifications 
themselves. 
III.  A SINGLE-ELECTION STRATEGY 
Repair California did not want to amend article XVIII, section 2, 
at one election and then, if Prop 1 passed, call for a convention at the 
next. Requiring two separate elections to put before the people the 
 
 6. An interesting historical footnote: In 1934, the legislature placed on the ballot, using 
article XVIII, section 2, procedures (i.e., by a two-thirds majority vote of both houses), the 
question of whether there should be a constitutional convention. The measure passed and 
therefore, under the constitution and as set forth in the measure, the legislature had the duty to 
“provide for” the convention. The legislature never acted and a convention was never held. 
 7. AB 4 was introduced on December 1, 2008, by Assembly Member Blakeslee but was 
never heard by any committee and died of natural causes under article IV, section 10(c)’s, 
command that “any bill introduced during the first year of the biennium of the legislative session 
that has not been passed by the house of origin by January 31 of the second calendar year of the 
biennium may no longer be acted on by the house.” 
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question of whether to call a constitutional convention would 
increase significantly the cost of the process. Given the enormous 
cost of mounting a modern-day campaign, a two-election scenario 
might present such a significant hurdle that a voter-led call for a 
convention would be derailed altogether. In addition, Repair 
California wanted to take as much advantage as possible of the 
economic crisis that began in 2008 and that it believed would fuel 
political support for its cause. It felt it essential that the call for the 
convention itself happen at the November 2010 general election. 
An important legal issue thus was whether Props 1 and 2 could 
appear on the same ballot. The problem was that without the 
constitutional authority provided by Prop 1’s modification, only the 
legislature could call for a convention. When voters went to the polls 
on November 2, 2010, Prop 1 would not yet have passed and the 
people therefore might not have the authority even to vote on Prop 2. 
Ordinarily an initiative is susceptible to a pre-election challenge 
on the basis that the voters lack the power to adopt the measure at the 
time it was presented to them.8 Such would be the case if Prop 1’s 
effectiveness were unknown when voters cast their votes on Prop 2. 
The safest course of action would have been to adopt a two-election 
strategy and wait until Prop 1 passed before putting Prop 2 on the 
ballot. But Repair California determined this proposal politically 
unacceptable. 
We saw the single-election strategy as a significant legal 
obstacle and assumed it would be one that those seeking to derail the 
convention would seize upon through a pre-election challenge to 
Prop 2. But we formulated a creative, and relatively untested, legal 
solution to the problem so as to allow the voters to approve both 
Props 1 and 2 at a single election. 
In order to solve the single-election problem, we added language 
to Prop 1 such that it would apply retroactively if enacted. The 
amended constitutional provision empowering voters to call for a 
convention would therefore technically be in effect on the same 
election day when voters would also have been asked to adopt 
Prop 2, which would call for the constitutional convention itself. The 
language we included in Prop 1 read: 
 
 8. AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609, 613–16 (1984). 
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This measure, if passed, shall be deemed operative and in 
effect on the entire day of the election at which it is passed, 
and shall allow the people to consider the question of 
whether to call for a constitutional convention at the same 
election as the one at which the people vote on this 
measure. 9 
Like most of the issues surrounding the convention, there was 
no precedent based on a similar factual situation, making it 
impossible to predict with certainty how a court would react to a 
retroactive constitutional amendment. Nevertheless, we felt it likely 
that a single-election approach would withstand judicial scrutiny 
because (a) it was consistent with the plain meaning of the 
constitution, (b) it was supported by established judicial precedent, 
and (c) it furthered the strong public policy of popular sovereignty 
enshrined in the constitution. 
A.  The Constitution on Its Face Does Not Prevent  
Retroactive Application 
Article XVIII, section 4, states that “unless the measure provides 
otherwise,” a constitutional initiative takes effect the day after the 
election at which it passed. 10 On its face, section 4 therefore 
acknowledges that a measure may state an effective date other than 
the day after the election. This clause is ordinarily invoked to provide 
for an effective date later than the day after the election, but nothing 
in section 4’s express language commands such an interpretation. 11 
Nor does retroactive application of a constitutional amendment 
offend other constitutional provisions. 12 
We believed that based on a plain-language reading of the 
constitution, there was no reason why we could not draft Prop 1— 
granting voters the power to call for a constitutional convention—so 
as to take effect retroactively. As such, it would grant voters on 
 
 9. Inactive Initiative Measure 09-0066, supra note 3. 
 10. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Article I, section 9, provides that “[a] bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.” CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9. None of these 
three prohibitions applied to the constitutional convention, as no one was being declared guilty of 
a crime without benefit of a trial, no ex post facto application of a penal statute was at issue, see 
Conservatorship of Hofferber, 616 P.2d 836, 849 (1980), and no contractual obligations would be 
affected by a retroactive application of the constitutional initiative, Prop 1. 
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election day the power to call for the constitutional convention 
through Prop 2. 
B.  California Courts Confirm That Initiatives  
May Take Effect Retroactively 
The issue of a retroactive constitutional amendment does not 
appear to have been ever squarely before California courts, but 
courts have examined retroactive statutory initiatives. 13 One case of 
note, Estate of Cirone v. Cirone, 14 concerned Proposition 6, passed in 
1982, by which the voters repealed the state’s inheritance tax. 15 
Proposition 6 provided that it was operative as of the date of its 
passage. 16 The respondent died on election day, but before the polls 
closed. 17 The question was whether respondent’s estate was subject 
to the estate tax that had been repealed on the day he died. 18 The 
petitioner argued that Proposition 6’s operative-date provision could 
not trump the constitutional statement that initiatives take effect the 
day after the election and that the measure’s effective date should 
therefore be the day after the election. 19 
The Estate of Cirone court first emphasized the literal reading of 
the constitution discussed above in Section A. 20 The court further 
reasoned that “a retroactive law . . . is not inherently 
unconstitutional” and that there was therefore no constitutional bar to 
a retroactive application of Proposition 6. 21 Finally, the court found 
that although a law is not ordinarily retroactively applied unless 
necessary to effectuate its purpose, retroactive application of 
Proposition 6 was necessary to implement the measure’s express 
provision concerning the effective date. 22 
 
 13. See, e.g., Estate of Cirone v. Cirone, 200 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1984). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 512. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 516. The use of the word “operative” in Proposition 6 and “effective” in the 
constitution is not significant. The Estate of Cirone court ruled that “the distinction between 
operative and effective date is not rigid, but should be liberally construed to achieve the purpose 
of the law involved.” Id. In an abundance of caution, we nevertheless drafted Prop 1 to be 
“operative and in effect” retroactively. 
 20. Id.; supra Part III.A. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. (citing DiGenova v. State Bd. of Educ., 367 P.2d 865, 869–70 (1962)). 
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We could not find a single example in which a court rejected the 
retroactive application of an initiative measure, statutory or 
constitutional, when (1) the text of the measure provided for such 
retroactivity and (2) the measure did not conflict with or offend other 
constitutional prohibitions. To the contrary, courts uniformly have 
held that retroactive measures do not offend the constitution. 23 
C.  Strong Public Policy Supported the  
Retroactive Application of Proposition 1 
We expected challenges to the constitutional convention; key to 
the defense of many of those challenges was the concept of popular 
sovereignty expressed in article II, section 1, of the California 
Constitution, which is discussed at some length in Part VI below. 
Compared to this core constitutional principle, establishing “all 
political power . . . in the people,” 24 we felt that the issue of whether 
Prop 1 could apply retroactively paled in comparison. If the people 
approved both Props 1 and 2, it struck us as unlikely, as a matter of 
public policy, that a court would frustrate the will of the people by 
relying on an essentially procedural argument to disallow the voters 
the right to call for a constitutional convention. 
IV.  SELECTING DELEGATES TO A CONVENTION 
Article XVIII, section 2, of the constitution provides that 
“[d]elegates to a constitutional convention shall be voters elected 
from districts as nearly equal in population as may be practicable.” 25 
This requirement posed some significant political and policy issues 
for Repair California. First, electing delegates would mean that the 
convention would be further delayed—after a convention was called, 
there would need to be a separate election of delegates before the 
convention convened. Repair California did not want any delay and 
 
 23. See, e.g., Chapman v. Farr, 183 Cal. Rptr. 606, 608–09 (1982); Roth Drug, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 57 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936); City of Los Angeles v. Oliver, 283 P. 298, 302 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1929). There is nothing special about initiatives that lead courts to permit them to 
take effect retroactively. In California, even judicial decisions ordinarily apply retroactively, 
unless the decision overrules controlling authority that parties might justifiably have relied on. 
People v. Yartz, 123 P.3d 604, 614 (Cal. 2005); see also Burris v. Superior Court of Orange 
County, 103 P.3d 276, 283 (Cal. 2005) (“The general rule that judicial decisions are given 
retroactive effect is basic in our legal tradition.”) (citing Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 772 
P.2d 1059, 1062 (Cal. 1989)). 
 24. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 25. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
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in fact hoped to seat convention delegates within six months of the 
November 2010 election. 
Second, Repair California did not want to be restricted by the 
constitution’s command that delegates represent “districts as nearly 
equal in population as may be practicable.” 26 Practically, the 
reference to a district’s population meant that delegates had to be 
sorted either by assembly, senate, or board of equalization districts—
there are no other political boundaries in California that are 
determined by population. Repair California had no problem with 
proportional representation. But it wanted to involve local 
government—especially cities, counties, and school districts—in the 
delegate-selection process. It also wanted to honor the political 
reality of the dense populations of California’s three largest cities—
Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Jose. 27 
More fundamentally, however, Repair California was convinced 
that any election process would be unduly influenced by the political 
problems it felt were partly to blame for the state’s dysfunction and 
would produce a result that essentially mirrored the legislature—and 
would therefore be as paralyzed and ineffective as it considered that 
body to be. 28 The lengthy and heated conversations on the pros and 
cons of various methodologies of (s)electing delegates is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Repair California ultimately made the 
policy/political decision to utilize a unique method of determining 
delegates involving a complex combination of random delegate 
selection by the state auditor and appointment of delegates by 
delegate-selection committees made up of elected officials from local 
government. 
Article XVIII, section 2, requires that “[d]elegates to a 
constitutional convention shall be voters elected from districts as 
nearly equal in population as may be practicable.” 29 Repair 
California’s proposed methodology not only would have violated the 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. E-1 Population Estimates for Cities, Counties and the State with Annual Percent 
Change—January 1, 2009 and 2010, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN. (May 2010), http://www.dof.ca.gov/ 
research/demographic/reports/estimates/e-1/2009-10/. 
 28. Because Repair California wanted to insulate the convention as much as possible from 
the legislature, it also modified article XVIII, section 2, to remove sole power in the legislature to 
“provide for” the convention. Prop 2 detailed how a convention would be paid for and the 
procedures it would follow—leaving no role for the legislature. 
 29. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
  
Winter 2011] LEGAL QUESTIONS 555 
requirement that delegates be elected but also would have conflicted 
with the requirement that delegates represent districts as nearly equal 
in population as practical. Repair California did not want to be 
limited to any established districts as a basis for determining 
proportionality. Article XVIII, section 2, therefore had to be 
modified in order to reach Repair California’s goals. Each additional 
modification to article XVIII, section 2, raised the likelihood that the 
modifications might be held to be an impermissible revision (see Part 
VI below). But beyond the revision issue, Repair California’s 
proposed delegate-selection model presented additional legal 
unknowns. 
The application of the Voting Rights Act to Repair California’s 
complicated delegate-selection model could well be the topic of an 
entire article on its own. I discuss briefly only two key considerations 
we wrestled with. First was the question of whether section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act would apply to Repair California’s complex 
delegate-selection process. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
focuses on the discriminatory result of an electoral process in order 
to ensure that the electoral process is equally accessible to minority 
voters. 30 We concluded that section 2 arguably would not even apply 
to a process like Repair California’s, in which delegates were 
selected and not elected. The more significant Voting Rights Act 
issue concerned section 5 of the Act. 
Section 5 of the Act requires that the U.S. Department of Justice 
pre-clear any attempt to change “any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with 
respect to voting . . . .” 31 Given that the last constitutional convention 
was in 1879, we did not know whether modifying article XVIII, 
section 2, to allow selection of delegates was a change to a voting 
practice such that pre-clearance would be required. 
However, if section 5 of the Act required pre-clearance of 
Repair California’s non-electoral method of delegate selection, we 
thought such pre-clearance would likely be forthcoming, especially 
as no benchmark existed against which to compare Prop 2’s newly 
created method of delegate selection. The support for this argument 
lies in the Department of Justice regulations, which provide: 
 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); see Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
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Where at the time of submission of a change for Section 5 
review there exists no other lawful practice or procedure for 
use as a benchmark . . . [the] preclearance determination 
will necessarily center on whether the submitted change 
was designed or adopted for the purpose of discriminating 
against members of racial or language minority groups. 32 
So long as we could show that delegate selection was not 
designed with any discriminatory purpose, we believed that Repair 
California’s delegate-selection process would comply with the 
Department of Justice regulations and could withstand a challenge 
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Repair California’s method 
relied mostly on random selection, which could not reflect any 
discriminatory purpose and would in fact arguably result in greater 
minority representation than an election 33 (minority turnout might 
well be low in any special election called for the sole purpose of 
electing delegates). The selection of almost all the remaining 
delegates under Repair California’s methodology would be by local 
government officials. Such local government officials are often 
elected in non-partisan contests. 34 Because of the argument that there 
is lower minority turnout in non-partisan elections than in partisan 
ones, 35 giving non-partisan local government officials delegate-
selection power could implicitly indicate a discriminatory purpose. 
However, the plan to empower local government officials had the 
strong political support of local minority groups, whose support we 
thought would be useful in allaying any concerns the Department of 
 
 32. 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b)(4) (2010). 
 33. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in 
Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1009 (1995) (“The Supreme Court’s recognition of 
vote dilution claims under Section 2 of the Act bespeaks a realistic recognition that community 
leaders may deliberately minimize the influence of minorities by concentrating minority voters 
overwhelmingly in a single district or distributing them among many such districts.”). 
 34. See JOHN L. KOREY, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT 40 (Carolyn Merril et al. eds., 5th ed. 
2009) (“Of the thousands of elected federal, state, and local offices in California, over 99 percent 
are nonpartisan.”). 
 35. See Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, “Enhancing” Factors in At-Large 
Plurality and Majority Systems: A Reconsideration, 12 ELECTORAL STUD. 385 (1993); see also 
Devin Bent, Partisan Elections and Public Policy: Response to Black Demands in Large 
American Cities, 12 J. BLACK STUD. 291 (1982) (arguing that partisan elections result in 
substantially higher gains for substantive minority goals); Letter from Loretta King, Acting 
Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to James P. Cauley III, Esq., (Aug. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_081709.php. 
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Justice might have had about any discriminatory intent implicit in 
Repair California’s delegate-selection model. 
A final note on one unique aspect of the delegate-selection issue: 
Repair California’s delegate-selection model included a category of 
delegates Prop 2 called Indian Tribe Delegates. Indian Tribe 
Delegates would make up four of the approximately 460 total 
convention delegates. The exact amount would depend on population 
estimates determined by the state’s Department of Finance’s 
demographic research unit. These four delegates would be selected 
by the state’s federally recognized Indian Tribes. Calling out four 
Indian Tribe Delegates raised some interesting legal questions, in 
particular concerning California’s Proposition 209 restrictions on 
preferential treatment for “any individual or group on the basis of 
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin . . . .” 36 
In drafting Prop 2 so as to best insulate it against a 
Proposition 209 challenge, we relied on the important legal 
distinction between “Native American” and “Indian Tribes.” We 
reasoned that the term “Indian Tribes,” unlike the term “Native 
American,” did not refer to a racial or ethnic group subject to 
Proposition 209 at all. Rather, the federally recognized Indian Tribes 
are political organizations that exist without regard to any of 
Proposition 209’s categories. 37 The terms “Indian” and “Indian 
Tribe” are defined in federal law. 38 Indian Tribe Delegates would not 
be selected on the basis of their individual statuses as Native 
Americans, or any of the other prohibited categories in 
Proposition 209. Rather, they would be selected by the federally 
recognized Indian Tribes to serve as their representatives. 
We found no Proposition 209 case law on point regarding 
preferences for Indian Tribes. However, the California attorney 
general has recently opined that under some circumstances, the 
 
 36. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. There existed other potential challenges to the mandatory 
requirement of “Indian Tribe” delegates. We prepared some creative legal arguments to counter 
all we could think of. As the measures died before any challenge could be brought, these 
arguments were never used, or even well developed. 
 37. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 n.24 (1974) (holding employment 
preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs did not constitute invidious racial 
discrimination in part because “the preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting 
of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. . . . In this sense, 
the preference is political rather than racial in nature”). 
 38. 25 U.S.C. § 450b (d)–(e) (1994). 
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“political” classification of Indian Tribes is outside the scope of 
Proposition 209’s racial classifications. 39 In addition, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has indicated that under some circumstances, Indian 
Tribes are a “political” rather than a “racial” classification. 40 
V.  CAN A “RUNAWAY” CONVENTION BE PREVENTED? 
Repair California did not have a pre-ordained set of issues it 
wanted the convention to address. On the other hand, and critical to 
the political success of the movement, Repair California needed to 
ensure that the convention would not get sidetracked by issues that 
could have made the end result unpalatable to a majority of the 
voters. Repair California felt that core structural governance 
problems were at the heart of California’s problems. It also needed, 
for political reasons, to focus the convention on those structural 
issues. Certain issues were so politically inflammatory that Repair 
California would not have received support for a convention if there 
had been a possibility of a runaway convention that was held hostage 
by single-issue constituencies. 
Prop 2 therefore called out four permissible areas of structural 
revision and enumerated a list of topics prohibited from 
consideration by the delegates. While there were many policy 
discussions that led to Repair California’s decision regarding limiting 
the convention’s scope, I focus here only on the underlying legal 
questions of whether and how the initiatives could limit the 
convention’s scope and, even if they could, what would happen if the 
convention delegates decided to ignore those limitations. 
We found a paucity of California legal authority on the topic. In 
other states, however, courts have recognized limits to the subject 
matter of constitutional conventions if the people have approved 
those limitations. 41 Absent any authority to the contrary and given 
the prudential nature of a scope-limiting provision, we therefore 
drafted Prop 1 to allow the people, when calling for a convention, to 
 
 39. 93 Op. Cal. Att’y Gen. 19 at 13 (2010). The California Attorney General later points out 
that “courts have recognized that membership in a tribe and Indian ancestry are not necessarily 
coextensive concepts.” Id. at 37 n.47. 
 40. Id. at 13; see also Morton, 417 U.S. at 553 (applying similar arguments with regard to 
Proposition 209 to an analysis under federal anti-discrimination law). 
 41. ROBERT WILLIAMS & G. ALAN TARR, CTR. FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES, THE 
LAW OF LIMITED STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, available at 
http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/njtaxconvpapers/report7.pdf. 
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also describe any limits on the convention’s scope. Of course, this 
resulted in even more modifications to article XVIII, section 2 and 
further raised the specter of Prop 1 being held to be an impermissible 
revision. 
Even assuming we could legally limit the convention’s scope, it 
was less clear how to prevent the delegates from ignoring those 
restrictions and exceeding the scope. After all, we were putting such 
faith in the doctrine of popular sovereignty: Were we being two-
faced by now stating that delegates could not determine on their own 
what topics to consider? Our answer to this question was that while 
the people, through an election, could impose limits on the 
convention, the concept of popular sovereignty did not extend to the 
selected delegates—whose actions could be limited by the will of the 
people who had placed them in their seats in the first place by calling 
for the convention. 
On this point, we found little definitive judicial guidance. We 
included language in both Props 1 and 2 indicating that the 
limitations on scope were to be judicially enforceable. It seemed to 
us that judges were the right people to decide whether a proposed 
revision exceeded the convention’s permissible scope. In addition, 
we thought that empowering the courts in this fashion might improve 
the odds of a court viewing a scope-limiting provision as an 
amendment and not a revision. In so doing, we also hoped to delay 
any legal battle over whether a proposed constitutional revision 
exceeded the permissible scope until after the convention had 
completed its business. Repair California’s fundamental concern was 
to see a convention happen, and it was prepared to take a wait-and-
see attitude toward what the results of such a once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity might be. 
We anticipated that political pressures on the delegates, as well 
as the knowledge that their work could be subject to judicial 
enforcement if they exceeded their permitted boundaries, would 
constrain delegates who would not want to see their hard work 
blocked at the end of the convention process. In addition, the 
convention was structured so as to be under the guidance, and to 
some extent the leadership, of the Fair Political Practices 
Commission. We hoped the commission would provide oversight 
that would keep the convention on track and within its permissible 
boundaries. Finally, the convention mandated by Prop 2 called for 
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maximum transparency and prescribed considerable public input. 
Such input could also serve as a practical constraint on a runaway 
convention. 
VI.  REVISION VERSUS AMENDMENT 
As discussed above, Repair California at first proposed 
modifying article XVIII, section 2, to allow the question of whether 
to hold a convention to be placed on the ballot by initiative and not 
only by a two-thirds vote of the legislature. But policy 
determinations resulted in the need for Prop 1 to propose significant 
additional modifications to article XVIII, section 2, to accommodate 
Repair California’s proposal. As finally drafted, Prop 1 intended to 
accomplish the following: (1) the people could place on the ballot the 
question of whether there should be a convention without the need 
for a two-thirds vote of the legislature; (2) the question of whether 
there should be a convention could specify limits to the convention’s 
scope, and (3) the question of whether there should be a convention 
could specify that delegates were to be selected instead of elected. 
The final language of Prop 1 therefore proposed a modification of 
article XVIII, section 2, as follows: 
(a) The Legislature by rollcall vote entered in the journal, 
two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring, 
may submit at a general election the question whether to 
call a convention to revise the Constitution. If the majority 
vote yes on that question, within 6 months the Legislature 
shall provide for the convention. Delegates to a 
constitutional convention shall be voters elected from 
districts as nearly equal in population as may be practicable. 
(b) The question of whether to call a convention to revise 
the Constitution may be placed on the ballot for any state-
wide election by the same process set forth in Article 2, 
Section 8 for a statutory initiative measure, so long as no 
convention has convened within ten years of such an 
election. 
(c) Whether submitted as set forth in paragraph (a) or (b), 
the question of whether to call a convention to revise the 
Constitution (1) may prescribe judicially enforceable limits 
on the areas of the Constitution to be considered for 
revision, and the manner in which the convention is to be 
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provided for if a majority of voters vote yes on the question, 
(2) may authorize the convention to propose both a revision 
and a series of separate amendments to the Constitution; 
and (3) shall specify a fair method for selecting or electing 
citizens to be delegates to a constitutional convention. 42 
(Strike-through and italicized language reflects language to be 
stricken from and added to section 2 respectively.)  
A fundamental question raised by the final version of Prop 1, 
perhaps the single most important legal issue facing Repair 
California, was whether it was an amendment to or a revision of the 
constitution. The constitution is clear that the people may amend the 
constitution by initiative, 43 but that a revision of the constitution may 
not be enacted by initiative but may only be enacted either through a 
constitutional convention or by a measure placed on the ballot by a 
two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature and approved by a 
majority of the voters. 44 But the constitution nowhere defines 
“amendment” or “revision” or explains the difference between the 
two. 
The California Supreme Court, however, has provided 
considerable interpretive guidance. 45 The court has essentially 
defined the boundaries of a permissible amendment in the negative—
in other words, an amendment is any constitutional modification that 
does not cross the line into an impermissible revision. The court 
looks to two factors to determine where that line is—quantitative and 
qualitative. 46 
“[A]n enactment which is so extensive in its provisions as to 
change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the Constitution by the 
deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions may well 
constitute a revision . . . .” 47 The classic example of a quantitative 
revision is McFadden v. Jordan. 48 In that case, an initiative proposed 
 
 42. This language reflects certain policy decisions that are not the focus of this brief Article; 
for instance, the limiting language that would only allow a convention every ten years and the use 
of the word “fair” in the last sentence both were the result of policy/political decisions that 
nonetheless had some legal implications. 
 43. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
 44. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1, 2, 4. 
 45. See e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 46. Id. at 89. 
 47. Id. 
 48. McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948). 
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to repeal or substantially alter at least fifteen of the constitution’s 
articles and included more than 21,000 words. 49 The court 
invalidated the measure as an impermissible revision—before the 
voters even had a chance to vote—due to the sheer quantity of the 
proposed changes. 50 
However, “even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish 
such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental 
plan as to amount to a [qualitative] revision . . . .” 51 The court has 
found that a small quantitative change may nevertheless be a 
qualitative revision if it makes a fundamental change in the basic 
nature of the governmental plan or framework established by the 
constitution. 52 
There seemed to be little chance that a court would find Prop 1, 
which modified a single section of a single constitutional article, a 
quantitative revision. But more troubling was the question of whether 
a court would see Prop 1 as crossing over the line into territory of an 
impermissible revision under the qualitative analysis. Though the 
issue has been before the court not infrequently, 53 the court has only 
once struck down an initiative on the basis that it was a qualitative 
revision. 54 
That one case, Raven v. Deukmejian, 55 concerned a criminal 
justice measure (1990’s Proposition 115) that sought, among other 
things, to provide that numerous state constitutional provisions 
granting rights to criminal defendants should not be construed to 
afford greater rights than those afforded by analogous provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution. 56 The court found that the measure would 
effectively limit its own authority and instead vest power to interpret 
the state constitution in the federal courts. 57 This limit on the state 
judicial branch’s power, the court held, was such a substantial 
 
 49. Id. at 790–96. 
 50. Id. at 788. 
 51. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 
1286 (Cal. 1978). 
 52. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 100. 
 53. See id. at 84–98. 
 54. Id. at 100. 
 55. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990). 
 56. Id. at 1081. 
 57. Id. at 1086–87. 
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alteration of the basic structure of government that it rose to the level 
of a revision. 58 
Though far from certain, we were optimistic that a court 
following Raven and Strauss would not find Prop 1 to be a revision. 
The analysis below follows Repair California’s three main 
modifications to article XVIII, section 2, discussed above. 
A.  Allowing the People to Place on the Ballot the Question of 
Whether There Should Be a Convention 
 The California Constitution makes clear that the people are the 
ultimate source of constitutional power:  
 “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is 
instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.” 59 
“The legislative power of this State is vested in the California 
Legislature . . . but the people reserve to themselves the powers of 
initiative and referendum.” 60 
Given the above two constitutional commandments, what could 
be a more fundamental exercise of the people’s political power than 
voting to hold a constitutional convention? Moreover, the California 
Supreme Court has ruled time and again that the initiative power 
must be liberally construed and that reasonable doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the exercise of this power. 61 
 
 58. Id. Significantly, the court, in expressly rejecting the suggestion that any of the other, 
more specific constitutional changes made by Proposition 115 constituted a revision, stated, “The 
additional constitutional changes effected by Proposition 115, involving such isolated matters as 
postindictment preliminary hearings, joinder of cases, use of hearsay, reciprocal discovery, and 
the People’s right to due process and a speedy, public trial, cannot be deemed matters which 
standing alone, or in the aggregate, substantially change our preexisting governmental 
framework.” Id. at 1086; see also Strauss, 207 P.3d at 94. 
 59. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 60. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 61. See, e.g., Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n v. McPherson, 136 P.3d 178, 185 (Cal. 2006) 
(citing Associated Home Builders Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (1976) and Carlson v. 
Cory, 189 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983)); see also Santa Clara Cnty. Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino, 
902 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1995) (stating that the initiative power must be “liberally construed” but 
nevertheless finding initiative-passed transportation tax unconstitutional for not having received a 
two-thirds majority vote of the electorate as required for special taxes); Legislature of Cal. v. 
Deukmejian, 669 P.2d 17, 27 (Cal. 1983) (“Although the initiative power must be construed 
liberally to promote the democratic process[,] when utilized to enact statutes, those statutes are 
subject to the same constitutional limitations and rules of construction as are other statutes.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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[The initiative is] one of the most precious rights of our 
democratic process. It has long been our judicial policy to 
apply a liberal construction to this power whenever it is 
challenged in order that the right be not improperly 
annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of 
the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it. In 
response to this broad constitutional reservation of power in 
the people, the courts have consistently held that the 
Constitution’s initiative and referendum provisions should 
be liberally construed to maintain maximum power in the 
people. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of the 
exercise of these rights. 62 
The strongest argument Repair California had—and one that lay 
at the heart of many of the issues surrounding the constitutional 
convention—was the doctrine of popular sovereignty expressed in 
article II. If the constitution gives all political power to the people, 
and if the constitution grants the people the right to alter or reform 
the government when the public good may require it, then surely the 
people ought to be able to decide whether to grant themselves the 
power to place on the ballot the question of whether there should be 
a convention without a two-thirds vote of the legislature. In any 
event, a qualitative revision requires a fundamental change in the 
constitutional framework. 63 Allowing the people to place on the 
ballot the question of whether there should be a constitutional 
convention would not alter the existing constitutional rules that 
(1) the people would vote on whether there should in fact be a 
convention (namely, Prop 2) and (2) at the end of the process the 
people would vote on whether to approve the revision itself. The 
only arguable change to the constitutional framework would be a 
relatively insignificant and procedural one, namely that the 
legislature would not have the sole power to start the constitutional 
convention process—all the remaining steps necessary to approve 
and hold a convention (not to mention ultimate approval of the work 
of a convention) would not be altered by allowing the people to ask 
the initial question: Should there be a constitutional convention? 
 
 62. Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, 136 P.3d at 185–86 (quoting Associated Home Builders, 
Inc., 557 P.2d at 477 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 63. See, e.g., Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 99–101 (Cal. 2009) (citing Legislature of Cal. 
v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1318–20 (1991)). 
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It struck us as not insignificant that the one case in which the 
Supreme Court of California found a ballot measure to be a revision, 
Raven, concerned perceived limits on judicial power. 64 Prop 1 would 
not affect the power of the judiciary in any way. In fact, it arguably 
would not affect the balance of power of any of the branches of 
government—it would only give to the people a power that would 
also still remain with the legislature (which could always call for a 
convention itself under Prop 1’s modified article XVIII, section 2) 
but that the legislature was not exercising. Of all the changes Prop 1 
proposed, allowing the people to ask whether to have a convention 
seemed to us the least controversial. 
B.  Limiting Scope 
As discussed in Part V above, Prop 1 proposed to modify 
article XVIII, section 2, to allow the people to limit the convention’s 
scope when calling for a convention. We found no useful precedent 
that would allow us to predict with any certainty whether a court 
would find this to be a “far reaching” change in government that 
would amount to a revision. 65 But in the absence of any California 
precedent to draw on, we thought it probable that other states’ 
methodologies would persuade a court (see Part V, above) to 
conclude that limiting the convention’s scope was prudent and 
would, if anything, limit changes in government rather than promote 
the kind of far-reaching changes that might characterize the measure 
as a revision. While we anticipated a likely battle after the 
convention as to whether a proposed revision exceeded the 
permissible scope, we distinguished that issue from whether we 
could limit the scope in the first place. 
C.  Selecting Delegates 
As discussed in Part IV above, Repair California could not 
accept a process that involved the election of delegates to a 
convention, as is currently called for in the constitution. 66 We 
thought that the issue that raised the largest risk of a court finding 
Prop 1 to be a revision was the portion of the measure that eliminated 
 
 64. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1077 (Cal. 1990). 
 65. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 288–89 (Cal. 1982). 
 66. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2. 
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the requirement for electing delegates and permitted an unspecified 
selection process instead. (The details of the process were contained 
in Prop 2 so that challenges to the particular methodology would be 
distinguished from challenges to the concept of delegate selection.) 
Especially when viewed in combination with Prop 1’s other changes, 
we wondered whether a court would view removing the requirement 
that delegates be elected as fundamentally at odds with an electoral 
structure that is at the heart of so many of our democratic processes. 
It is important to remember that Prop 1 did not prohibit the 
election of delegates. It only specified that the measure calling for a 
convention—namely, Prop 2—should specify the details of how 
delegates were to be elected or selected. The legal issue concerning 
whether such a change amounted to a revision did not necessarily 
have to do with the specifics of a particular delegate-selection model 
(which would be a challenge to Prop 2). Rather, the judicial focus 
would, we hoped, center on shifting the decision as to the 
methodology out of the constitution altogether. In other words, the 
question was not whether Prop 1 was a revision because it allowed 
delegates to be selected. Rather, the question was whether Prop 1 
was a revision because it gave the people the power, when calling for 
a convention, to decide whether and how delegates were to be 
elected or selected. The policy and political determination not to 
elect delegates was so fundamental to Repair California’s movement 
that providing a definitive answer to this significant question 
ultimately turned out not to be terribly important—electing delegates 
was such a non-starter that any legal risk was worth taking. 
We had no ready legal solution to this problem beyond the 
popular sovereignty doctrine that we imagined would become the 
ultimate defense to almost any question having to do with the 
convention. A fundamental question that would have been for the 
courts to decide is what, if any, limits are there to the popular 
sovereignty theory. 67 We acknowledged that we would be testing the 
limits of this theory. But we placed our bets on a court bending over 
backward to further the intent of voters who had voted to call a 
convention to revise their own constitution. 
 
 67. What such limits might be is a subject worthy of additional analysis but is beyond the 
scope of this brief Article. 
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D.  The “Back Door” 
While we could not answer with certainty the question of 
whether a court would find Prop 1 to be an impermissible revision, 
we did have a possible way of getting around the problem in the first 
place. We drafted Prop 1 to include a “back door” through which we 
hoped a court would allow the convention to proceed if necessary. 
Prop 1 allowed the people to “authorize the convention to 
propose both a revision and a series of separate amendments to the 
Constitution.” 68 The inclusion of this phrase had two purposes: a 
practical future one and a preemptive legal one. The practical 
consideration was to give the convention maximum flexibility. If for 
some reason it could not—or deemed it prudent not to—arrive at a 
comprehensive revision, the convention could propose a series of 
amendments to be voted on separately like any other initiative. But 
more importantly, if a court struck down Prop 1 as being a revision 
(for instance, because of the delegate-selection issue), we intended to 
argue that delegates could still be selected for the purpose of a 
convention that would not revise the constitution but would instead 
propose a series of separate amendments. No representative body of 
elected delegates would be necessary for such a limited purpose as 
any individual can propose an amendment initiative. 69 We drafted the 
severability clause of Prop 1 expressly to indicate to a court hearing a 
challenge to the delegate-selection process that we intended the 
convention to take place even if it was not for the purpose of revising 
the constitution. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Funding necessary for a two-initiative signature-gathering effort 
dried up in the spring of 2010, and Repair California did not even 
manage to place Props 1 and 2 on the November 2010 ballot. There 
will be no constitutional convention in California in the foreseeable 
future. While my involvement was as an initiative drafter, I freely 
confess to being swept up by Repair California’s almost evangelical 
enthusiasm. In the hope that others will succeed where Repair 
California failed, I write this Article so that those who may follow in 
Repair California’s footsteps will have the benefit of our legal 
 
 68. Inactive Initiative Measure 09-0066, supra note 3. 
 69. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). 
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analysis. A constitutional convention is a dream whose time may not 
yet have come. 
